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"A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors":

Madison, Property Rights, and the
Abolition of Fee Tail
John F. Harte

Introduction
The Virginia statute enacted in 1776 to abolish the fee tail estate in land
forthrightly expresses a republican conception of property rights.1 The preamble asserts:
Mhe perpetuation ofproperty in certain families, by means of gifts made
to them in fee taille, is contrary to good policy, tends to deceive fair traders, who give a credit on the visible possession of estates, discourages the
holder thereof from taling care and improving the same, and sometimes
does inuy to the morals ofyouth, by rendering them independent of and
disobedient to their parents .... 2
* Lecturer, University of Chicago Law SchooL BA, Reed College, 1977; J.D., Yale
University, 1980. I am grateful for comments received from Joseph Bianclana, R.H. Helmholz,
and the faculty at Chicago-Kent College ofLaw, and for research assistance from Thomas Kantas.
1. See Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 THE STATUETS AT LARaE: BEINGACOlLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 226 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., J & G.
Cochran 1821) [hereinafter 9 LAWS OF VA.] (abolishing fee tail); GREGORY S. ALExANDER,
COMMODITY&PROPRIETY: COMYEIINGVISIONSOFPROPERTYINAMERICANLEGALTHOUGIr

1776-1970, at 29-41 (1997) (analyzing Thomas Jefferson's ideology of civic republicanism);
Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism andthe Law oflnheritancein theAmerican RevolutionaryEra,
76 MIC. L.R.v. 1,15-16 (1977) [hereinafterKatz,Republicanism and theLaw ofInheritance]

(discussing Jefferson's goal of abolishing fee tail); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the
Right to Propertyin RevolutionaryAmerica,19 J.L. & EcoN. 467,471-72 (1976) (same); see

also ALEXANDm, supra,at29 ("The core ofAmerican republican thought during the eighteenth
century was the idea that private 'interests' could and should be subordinated to the common
welfare of the polity."). Fee tail (entail) was an inheritable estate in land that could not be
alienated in fee simple by the current tenant in tail; it passed at death to the heir in tail (typically
determined by the rules of primogeniture). If the bloodline died out, with no remainder limited
to follow, the land reverted to the grantor (or the grantor's heir) in fee simple. See A.W.B.
SIMpsoN, A HISTORY OF TE LAND LAw 81-82, 90 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that tenancy in tail

resembled life tenancy). Today, only a handful of American states recognize fee tail. WalLiAM
M MCGOVEN, JR. ET AL, WILS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 463 (1988).
2.

Act of Oct. 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supra note 1, at226.
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The Assembly accordingly converted fee tail estates (entails) into fee simple
estates, explicitly extinguishing the corresponding interests of "the issue in
taille, and those in reversion and remainder."3 The statute thus transformed
fee tail estates already in existence as well as future fee tail estates.
It is well known that Thomas Jefferson led the effort to abolish fee tail in
Virginia 4 and that he later counted this legislation among his foremost achievements.5 For Jefferson, abolishing fee tail was "essential to a well ordered
republic.t 6 Abolition of fee tail was a key part of a "system" of reforms '"by
which every fibre would be eradicated of antient [sic] or future aristocracy and
a foundation laid for a government truly republican."
What is not well known is that James Madison, too, endorsed Virginia's
abolition of fee tail.' Madison, of course, is known for protecting property
rights, not for extinguishing them. Madison charged that state laws were
unjustly violating private rights under the Articles of Confederation,9 and he
3. Id.
4. See JOuRNALOFTHEHOUSEOFDELEGATES oFVIRINIA [Oct 7-Dec. 21,1776] at 13,
23 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd 1828) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(Oct 7-Dec. 21, 1776)] (noting that Jefferson presented bill to abolish fee tail); 1 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 560-61 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (Jefferson's bill to enable tenants in
fee tail to convey their lands in fee simple).
5.
See THOMAS JEFFERSON,Autobiography,in 1 THEWRrrNGsOFTHOMAS JEFFERSON
68-69 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons 1892) [hereinafter THOMAS
JEFFERSON,Autobiography](asserting importance of abolition of fee tail); THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Services ofJefferson, mi7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 476 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons 1896) (same).
6.
THOMAS JEFFEMSONAutobiography,supranote S, at 49.
7. Id. at68.
8. See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGRINA [Oct 17, 1785-Jan. 21,
1786], at 13 (Richmond, Va. 1786) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Oct
17,1785-Jan, 21, 1786)] (reporting Madison's introduction of bill "For regulating conveyances"
that extended scope of Act of 1776). The legislature approved the bill. Act of Oct.1785,
ch. LXIL 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEINGA COLLECiION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA
154, 156-57 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., George Cochran 1823) [hereinafter
12 LAWS OF VA.]; see also Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 3
LETrERS AND OTHER WIrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 122 (New York, R. Worthington 1884)
(attributing harm of "unequal distribution of property" to laws adopted from English common
law); id. at 477 (recalling "suffering" caused by entails); JAMES MADISON, Notes on Suffrage,
in 4 ETarERS AND OTmFRWMrnNGs OF JAMES MADISON 30 (New York, R. Worthington 1884)
[hereinafter 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage] (suggesting that new "republican laws of descent
and distribution" might promote shift in production from "luxuries" to "necessaries"); infra
notes 129-31,142-56, and accompanying text (discussing Madison's views).
9.
See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Vices ofthePoliticalSystemofthe UnitedStates,in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345-57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON] (asserting "injustice" of state laws, giving Rhode Island paper
money legislation as example).
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was prominent in drafting the Constitution.1 ° Madison composed lasting arguments in favor of constitutional protection for property rights in The Federalist," and he drafted and introduced in Congress the amendments that
became the Bill of Rights, 2 proposing the Takings Clause himself.'3 Therefore, Madison's support for abolishing fee tail, which extinguished property
rights deriving from fee tail tenure, merits investigation.
Virginia's abolition of fee tail shows, I will argue, that we need to revise
substantially our historical understanding of what property rights Madison
thought deserved constitutional protection. The prevailing view among modem
scholars is that Madison and other framers of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights favored withdrawing property rights generally from the realm ofpolitics
to that of fundamental law, to insulate private property from legislative interference. 4 But the abolition offee tail shows that even Madison was not nearly
10. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNvErnoNOF 1787 passim (Max Farrand ed., photo.
reprint 1966) (1937).
11. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 263,265,476-79 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter 10 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON] (asserting importance of protecting property rights).
12. See CREATINGTEEBILOFRIGHTS: THE DocUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS xiii-xiv, 11-14 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (reproducing Madison's
proposed resolution of amendments that became Bill of Rights).
13. SeeWilliam Michael Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingofthe Takings Clauseand
the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,791, 837 (1995) (analyzing Madison's role in
drafting of Takings Clause).
14. SeeJAMESW.ELYJ,TEmOUAPDIANOF EVERYOTHERRImT: A CONSTnTnTONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RiGimrs 42-48 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that framers "viewed popular
government as a potential threat to property rights"); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAIoNGS: PRiVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoM 3-5, 16 (1985) ("[P]rotection of private
property was a central objective of the original constitutional scheme."); JENNIFER NEDEISKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTYANDTHELIM1Ts 0FAMEICANCONSTmrTiONALsM 90-92,150-52, (1990)
(examining desire of Gouverneur Morris and James Madison to place property rights beyond
reach ofpolities); BARRYA. SHAiN, THE MYTH OFAMERICANINDIVIDUAuse THEPROTESTANT
ORIGNS OF AMERICAN POLrICAL THOuar 144-45 (1994) (protection of individual property
rights form legislative interference was ofprimary importance to Madison); CASS R. SUNSTEN,
AFTERTERIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCE1VINGTHEREGuIATORY STATE 17 (1990) ("organiz-

ing principle" of Bill of Rights was "desire to prevent collective interference with private ordering"); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact ofthe Concernfor theSecurityofProperVRights on the Legal
System of the EarlyAmericanRepublic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1144-45 (1980) (discussing
framers' concern for security of property rights); James W. Ely, Jr., '7hatDueSatisfactionMay
Be Made": The Fifth Amendment and the Originsof the Compensation Principle,36 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 1,1-2,17 (1992) (similar); Roger PilonFreedom,Responsibility andthe Constitution: On Recovering Our FoundingPrinciples,68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 513 (1993)
(stating that Founders envisioned "a world of private law"); Bernard H. Siegan, One People as
to CommercialObjects,inLIBERTY,PROPERTY& THEFOUNDATIONS OFTHEAMMICANCONSTITUTION 101 passim (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1986) ("[t]he right to
property - the freedom to acquire, use and dispose of it" was "major concern" of framers).

58 WASH. & LEE L. REV 167 (2001)
so libertarian as has been thought. Virginia's Act of 1776, by extinguishing the
property rights of heirs, reversioners, and remaindermen growing out offee tail
tenure,15 took wealth and transferred itto tenants in tail. Madison's support for
abolishing fee tail shows that his political philosophy of protecting private
property and his sense of fundamental justice allowed far greater scope for
legislative intervention than has been recognized.
Abolishing fee tail was part of a legislative program supported by Madison as well as Jefferson, a program that was designed to shorten the longevity
of inherited wealth' and thereby lessen the "proportion of idle proprietors" in
Virginia society. 7 Another purpose of the legislation was to promote "a
greater simplicity in manners" and "a less consumption ofmanufactured superfluities."' 8 By this legislation, Madison hoped that although "great wealth"
might still come to "individuals" "for a certain time," "the opportunities may
be diminished and the permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of the
laws." 9 Madison's support for abolishing fee tail shows that in some circumstances he believed it was legitimate to prefer the welfare of the community
over the property rights of individuals.
The historical significance of Virginia's abolition of fee tail in 1776
depends, of course, on where matters stood before 1776. Here my thesis challenges the conclusion of some modem historians that the private legislation of
the colonial Assembly "docking" entails was essentially a procedural formality
permitting tenants in tail to defeat the rights of heirs in tail and others.20 My
thesis also challenges the conclusion of other modem historians that Virginia's
15. Act of Oct. 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWs OFVA., supranote 1, at226.
16. Related measures displaced primogeniture with partible inheritance as the rule governing intestate succession to land, and abolished the doctrine of survivorship among joint
tenants. See inffra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
17. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19,1786), in 9 THE PAPERs
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 9, at 77.
18. Id.
19. 4 MADISoN, Notes on Suffrage, supra note 8, at 24 (emphasis added). Dictating
"permanency" of land ownership in a bloodline was the purpose served by creating a fee tail
estate. See infra notes 28-34, 36-57, and accompanying text (describing mechanics of succession).
20. See DANIELJ.BOORsiNTEAMERICANS: TECOLONALEXI
ECE 120 (1958)
(explaining Virginia's legislative power of giving tenant in tail full ownership of entailed land
as "routine," comparable to "routine court procedures" in England); GORDON S. WOOD, TBE
RADICAuMOF TBEAMERICANREVOLUTION 182 (1992) (stating "docdng of entails" was "very
common in Virginia" before 1776); Bernard Bailyn, Politicsand Social Structure in Virginia,
in COLONIALAMEmICA: ESSAYS INPOITLcs AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 135,154-55 (Stanley
N. Katz ed., 1971) (stating special acts commonly used to "break" entails); see also infra notes
70-76 and accompanying text (discussing legislative process permitting substitution of fee"
simple property for entailed property between 1710 and 1776).
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abolition of fee tail was merely symbolic rather than practical in significance
because fee tail had not been utilized widely there.2
I will show that fee tail, even if not pervasively used among Virginia
landowners, was nonetheless common enough that its abolition was meaningful for practical as well as procedural or symbolic reasons. Many ofthe legislators who voted to abolish fee tail in 1776 were quite familiar with Virginia's
distinctive law of fee tail estate because they personally had encountered its
constraints, in some public or private capacity.' Private acts docking entail in
colonial Virginia generally had transformed, rather than redistributed, wealth.
The colonial Assembly, by insisting that fee simple property be substituted in
exchange for releasing entailed property, had guarded the property rights of
heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen.' The state Assembly's fee tail
acts of 1776 and 1785, which explicitly extinguished all rights in entailed property except those of the current tenant in tail,24 therefore marked a sharp
turnabout in Virginia's substantive law. Because ofthis practical impact, the
legislation abolishing fee tail poses a concrete test of the character and scope
of contemporary constitutionalism. It shows that Madison and others viewed
some property rights as legitimately subject to legislative intervention for the
common welfare.' Indeed, Madison viewedthe abolition of fee tail as a source
of analogy for future legislative interference with other forms ofproperty.26
I. The Fee TailEstate in Colonial Virginia
To evaluate the practical impact ofthe Act of 1776 enacted to abolish fee
tail, it is necessary to assess the substance of Virginia's law of fee tail before
1776. Analysis must begin with a look at the English background. Fee tail or
entail was a grant of land to "A and the heirs of his body." It was already in
use before 1285 when Parliament enacted the statute de Donis Conditionabilis,responding to petitions from landowners who wanted to bestow on a
child and the heirs of his or her body an inheritable estate in land that could
21. SeeAExNDRA supra note 1, at 38,40,395 (in America, significance of entail was
"symbolic" rather than "functional;" even in Virginia, entail was not "prevailing custom"); Katz,
Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance, supra note 1, at 13-14 (abolition of entail in
Virginia and other states was "largely formal and symbolic").
22. See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text (describing experience of particular
Virginia legislators with constraints of legislative fee tail process).
23. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing procedure to remove entailment).
24. Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAws OF VA., supra note l,at226; Act of Oct. 1785,
ch. LXII, 12 LAWs OF VA., supra note 8, at 154,156-57.
25. See infra notes 143-63 and accompanying text (discussing reasons given by Madison
and Jefferson favoring legislative alteration of private property rights).
26. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's views).
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not be alienated in fee simple.' The first tenant in tail would hold the rough
equivalent of a life estate. If he or she died with no heir and no remainder
limited to follow, the land would revert by operation of law to the grantor or
the grantor's heir, in fee simple.
For many years after 1285, it was uncertain how long fee tail's restraints
on alienation were effective. Some thought the restraint on alienation was enforceable only against the first tenant in tail; others thought the restraint good
for three generations,' or until the entry of the third heir in tail.30 The view
that fee tail was potentially infinite in duration eventually prevailed over
time.3' But this development was in turn largely eclipsed by another. English
courts permitted tenants in tail to bar (defeat) the entail by using collusive
legal proceedings that resulted in a "common recovery."'32 These proceedings,
properly orchestrated, left the heir in tail, the reversioner, and any remaindermen with worthless causes of action against a nominal defendant (sometimes
the court crier), while converting the tenant's interest into fee simple. 33 Collusive common recoveries had become so familiar over the years as to be
considered a matter of right, prior to the English settlement of Virginia.3 4
English colonists in seventeenth century Virginia created fee tail estates
in their wills and deeds, and at some point Virginia courts evidently began
permitting tenants in tail to bar entails as in England. In 1710 the Virginia
Assembly blocked this practice, prohibiting tenants in tail from using "fine or
recovery" to "cut off or defeat any estate in fee tail," or to avoid fee tail "by
any ways or means whatsoever, except only by an Act of the General Assembly of this Dominion... in such particular case, respectively to be had and
27. 13 Edw., c.1 (1285), THE STATUTES ATLARGE 163 (DanbyPickering ed., Cambridge,
Joseph Bentham 1762); see also SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 81-82 (discussing function of

stattte).
28.

See SIMPSON, supranote 1, at 82 (discussing reversions).
29. Id. at 82-83.
30.
See generally JoSEPH BIANCALANA, THE FEE TAIL AND THE COMMON RECOVERYiN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, 1176-1502 (forthcoming, 2001).
31.
See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 84 (stating that interest "descended on a limited class
of heirs adinfinitum").

32. See id.at 129-38 passim (discussing how collusive common recovery evolved to bar
entails).
33. Carter v. Tyler, 5 Va. (1 Call) 165, 182 (1797) (English law gave only "fictitious"
recompense for entailed property "in the form ofthe fine and recovery"); see also J.H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGISH LEGAL HISTORY 235-36 (1979) (stating that neither issue nor
remainderman were allowed to attack successful common recovery); SIMPSON, supranote 1, at
131-35 (same). The "fine" was another collusive action that permitted breaking an entail. See
iai
at 138 (noting that during Henry V!i's reign it was settled that fine would bar issue in tail).
34. See Hethersal v. fildmay, 6 Eng. Rep 40, 41 (1605) (holding that right to common
recovery in incident of fee tail). See generallyBIANCALANA, supranote 30.
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made."3 5 Virginia courts were thus deprived of their common law power to
cut off entails.
The Assembly proceeded to develop a distinctive procedure of its own
that restored to fee tail estates the potentially perpetual, dynastic character that
donors of fee tail estates typically would have desired. Tenants in tail could
petition the Assembly to "dock" the entail of a particular parcel of entailed
land, converting it to fee simple.' But obtaining such relief depended on substituting fee simple land purported to be of the same value in place of the
entailed land. The substituted land had to be restricted according to the terms
of the original will or deed. The substitution generally happened in one oftwo
ways. Usually, certain other property the petitioning tenant in tail owned in fee

simple (of "greater" or "equal" value) would be entailed in place ofthe original
property.37 Alternatively, the Assembly would appoint several trustees,
directing them to sell the entailed land and use the proceeds to purchase other
property. 8 Either way, the private fee tail acts effected "a change ofthe lands
39
on which the estate tail was to operate," rather than "defeating that estate.1
Compared to English law, Virginia's private acts gave "a real recompense" by
replacing the entailed property, "instead ofthe fictitious one, in the form ofthe
fine and recovery."40 Parcels of entailed land worth £200 sterling or less were

exempt from this legislative protection after 1734.4'
35. Act of Oct 1710, ch. XIII, 3 THE STATUTES ATLARGE: BEINGA CO.EcTIONOFAIL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 517, 518 (William Walter Hening ed., Philadelphia, Thomas DeSilver
1823) [hereinafter 3 LAWS OF VA.]. The same provision had appeared in an earlier act of much
broader scope that was disallowed by the Crown. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XXI, 3 LAWS OF VA.,
supra,at304, 320.
36. See, e.g.,ActofFeb. 1745, ch.XXIX,5 TiESTATuTEsATLARGE: BEINGACOLIECTION OFALLTHE LAWS OF VRNA 397,399-400 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va.,
W.W. Gray 1819) [hereinafter 5 LAWS OF VA.] (docking entail of estate).
37. See, e.g.,Act ofNov. 1769, ch. LXXXII 8 ThE STATUTEs AT LARGE: BEINGACOLLECriON OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 470,472 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va.,
J. & G. Cochran 1821) [hereinafter 8 LAWS OF VA.] (substituting lands "of greater value"); Act
of Nov. 1769, ch. LXXVII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra,at 455, 456 (regarding substitution of property "ofequal value").
38. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 1769, ch. LXVII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 457,459
(requiring trustees to sell portion of property).
39. Carter v. Tyler, 5 Va. (1 Call) 165, 182 (1797).
40. Id. at 182.
41. See Act ofAug. 1734, ch. VI, 4 THM
STATUTE AT LARGE: BEiNG A COI.ECrTONOF
AiL THE LAWS OF VRGINIA 397,399-400 (William Walter Hening ad., Richmond, Va., W.W.
Gray 1820) [hereinafter 4 LAws oF VA.]. A tenant in tail could sell a parcel worth £200 or less
by deed, employing "fine, or recovery, according to the laws of England." Id. at 400. This
would bar "the right of the issue of the vender [sic], and of all other persons, in remainder or
reversion." Id. This procedure required preliminary certification by a sheriffs jury that the
parcel in question was indeed worth less than £200 sterling and that it had not been part of a
larger entailed parcel. Id.
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The resulting private acts recite or otherwise indicate that the derivative
rights of the heir in tail, the grantor's heir, and any remaindermen were protected by this legislative substitution process.42 Were the Assembly's procedures effective in protecting these rights? There are good reasons to think so.
The Assembly's substitutions took place in a highly public setting. A
petitioner had to give notice at the local church, three weeks running, of his
intention to seek this relief.43 After the petition seeking a private fee tail act
was read in the House of Burgesses and a bill was drafted, a committee investigated it.44 When a committee headed by the eminent lawyer Edmund
Pendleton, for example, reported to the House that it "had [e]xamined the
allegations of the Bill and found [them] to be true,"45 Pendleton's own interest
in protecting his reputation gives considerable reason to believe that the
substituted property was indeed equal in value to the property being disentailed. Virginia's session laws published the full text of the private fee tail
acts, 46 andthejournal ofthe House ofBurgesses also was published.' Itwould
be unlikely to escape the notice of family or neighbors ifthe Assembly were to
authorize dubious substitutions. Any doubts would have been all the more
sensitive because many ofthe potential victims (heirs in tail, reversioners, and
remaindermen) would be too young to safeguard their own interests. Other
members ofthe Assembly making such reports on private fee tail bills would
share this motivation to preserve their reputations intact, especially those most
prominent in provincial affairs.
A similar inference reasonably can be drawn from the many private acts
that appointed leading citizens as trustees to sell entailed land and reinvest the
proceeds in new property, to be settled according to the original restrictions.4 8
Acting in this fiduciary capacity, so open to view, these individuals presumably felt constrained to acquit themselves impeccably in the eyes of all concerned, rather than be suspected of participating in a fraud.
42. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 1772, ch. LXII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 631,632-33
("[lit will be greatly to the advantage of the [tenant in tail], and those claiming in remainder or
reversion," to sell entailed land and reinvest proceeds).
43. See, e.g.,id. at 633 (noting that tenant in tail had met these requirements).
44. See, e.g., JOURNALS OF ThE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VRGRUA, 1770-1772, at 12
(John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF ThE HOUSE OF BURGESSES,
1770-1772] (ordering committee to investigate petition of tenant in tail).
45. Id.at 35; id. at 68; id.at 94 (using similar language to summarize work ofPendleton's
committee on other occasions).
46. See, e.g., Acts of the General Assembly, 10 Geo. 3, at 53-57 (Williamsburg, William
Rind 1770) (reprinting verbatim eight private fee tail acts).
47. See, e.g.,JOURNALS OFTHEHOUSEOFBURGESSES, 1770-1772,supra note 44,at 153317.
48. See, e.g.,ActofFeb. 1772, ch. IXVI, 8LAWS OFVA.,supranote 37, at640 (appointing
George Washington, JohnAugustine Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and Richard Lee trustees).
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To obtain a private act allowing the docking of fee tail and substitution of
property was by no means a sure thing; it depended on the substance of what
the tenant in tail proposed. A fee tail petition, after being read, might be flatly
rejected,4 9 or it might be assigned for drafting, yet fail to resurface as a bill."0
Once a bill was drafled and presented, it mightbe rejected in the House, 1 or it
might survive and then die in committee.2 Many bills passed in the House
only after amendment. 3 A bill might pass in the House and be accepted by the
Council only after amendment 54 (sometimes the subject of contention 5), or the
Council might reject a bill without explanation.56 Such incidents indicate that
the Assembly did not credulously accept representations of comparative property values alleged by petitioning tenants in tail.
For the present purpose of understanding Virginia's law of fee tail on the
eve of its abolition in 1776, what matters is that the process of substitution of
property through private acts credibly appeared to protect the derivative interests of the heirs in tail, the reversioners, and any remaindermen from aggrandizement by the tenant in tail. The essential function of the colonial Assembly's docking process was to substitute assets ratherthanto redistribute wealth.
The identity of the entailed property changed, but the entailed status of the
wealth was protected.5"
i. The Act of 1776: Substantive, Formalor Symbolic Change?
Thebill 'to enabletenants intailleto conveytheir lands infee simple" was
taken up early inthe first session of Virginia's state Assembly, which convened
49. See JOURNALS OF THE HousE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1766-1769, at 32 (John
PendletonKennedyed., 1906) [hereinafterJOuaNALS OFTHEHOUSEOFBURGESSES, 1766-1769]
(rejecting petition ofRobert Bristow).
50. SeeJOURNALSOFTHBEHOUSEOFBURGESSES, 1766-1769,supranote49,at36 (assigning petition ofAugustine Claibome for drafting).
51.
SeeJOURNAiSOFTHEHOUsEOFBURGESSES, 1770-1772,supranote44,at86 (rejecting private bill on behalf of James Roscow after first reading).
52. See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, 1766-1769, supra note 49, at 33
(reporting assignment of private bill on behalf of John Willoughby to committee after being read
second time in House; this bill not subsequently mentioned).
53. See JOURNALS OF TE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, 1770-1772, supra note 44, at 41-42
(amending private bill on behalf of David and Sarah Meade); id. at 47 (amending private bill
on behalf of Armistead Lightfoot); id.at 50 (amending private bill on behalf of Sarah Rootes).
54. See id.
at 57-58 (amending private bill on behalf of Charles Carter).
55. See id. at 82, 84, 88, 93 (discussing proposed amendments of private bill on behalf
of Sarah Rootes which were rejected but later accepted).
56. See id. at 56 (rejecting private bill on behalf of Daniel M'Carty).
57. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (discussing substitution process and
requirements).
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in October 1776.58 This bill, brought in by a committee that included Jefferson,
gave tenants intail power to destroy the related rights of the heir in tail, the
59
reversioner, and any remaindermen, by conveying or devising the property.
An amendment was then proposed to transform all fee tail tenure into fee
simple, effective immediately.6' These alternatives were debated strenuously
in the House of Delegates; Speaker ofthe House Edmund Pendleton argued for
the permissive approach, while Jefferson pressed for outright abolition.'
Apparently no one argued for preserving intact Virginia's existing regime of
enforcing fee tail but permitting substitution of entailed assets. Finally the
House adopted the more drastic course, abolishing entail.62 The Senate concurred and the bill became law.63
James Madison, later so prominent in articulating and securing constitutional protection for property rights,' served in the 1776 Assembly.6' We
do not know whether Madison voted with Jefferson in 1776 to abolish fee tail
immediately, or with Pendleton merely to allow the option of disentailing.
Both alternatives provided for destroying the property rights of heirs in tail,
reversioners, and remaindermen. In 1785, Madison's support for outright
abolition was manifested unmistakably, when he introduced a bill in the
Assembly that extended the scope of the Act of 1776. The bill perfected the
conversion of all remaining tenancies in tail into fee simple and comprehensively extinguished all derivative rights of inheritance, reversion, and remainder back to that date.' Madison's correspondence indicates that later in
life he continued to endorse Virginia's abolition of fee tail. 6' Before using
58.

JOUaNALOFTHEHOUSEoFDEILEGATES (Oct 7-Dec.21,1776), supranoteo4,at 13.

59. See id.at 23 (reporting passage of bill enabling tenants in tail to convey lands in fee
simple).

60. See 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,supranote 4, at560-62 (explaining change
in character of bill from permissive power to convey in fee simple to abolition of fee tails).
61. See id.
at 561 (discussing Pendleton's strong opposition to amendment favored by
Jefferson's approach).
62. See id.
at 560-61 ("Bill to Enable Tenants in Fee Tail to Convey Their Lands in Fee
Simple").
63. Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS oF VA., supra note 1, at 226-27.
64. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text
65. See THE GENLERAL ASSmBLY OF VIRGImA, JULY 30, 1619-JANUARY 11, 1978 - A
BIcENTENaIAL REGISTER OF MEMBERS 123 (Cynthia Miller Leonard ed., 1978) [hereinafter
GENERALAsSEMBLY REGITER] (isting James Madison as Orange County representative).
66. SeeJouRNALOFTEHOUSEOIFDELEGATES (Oct.17,1785-Jan.21,1786),supranote
8, at 12-13 (recounting Madison's presentation of bills from committee for courts of justice,
including bill "For regulating conveyances"); Act of Oct 1785, ch. LXIL 12 LAws OF VA.,
supra note 8, at 154, 156-57 ("An act for regulating conveyances").

67.

See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 31,1824), in 3 LETIER

WRrnGS OF JAMES MADiSON, supranote 8, at 477 (stating entails impose "suffering" on society); infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text
AND OH
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Virginia's fee tail legislation to question the modem view of Madison and
the framers of the Constitution as holding libertarian views on the subject
of property rights,s however, we must consider modem scholarship that
has questioned the practical significance of fee tail tenure in Virginia before
1776.
A. Merely a FormalChange?
Some modem scholars discount the practical significance of fee tail
restrictions in colonial Virginia because they view the colonial Assembly's
private act procedure as essentially a formality,6 9 yielding the same substantive
result- evasion of all fee tail restrictions - as using fine and common recovery
in English courts of that era."° If indeed it was possible to circumvent restrictions so routinely in colonial Virginia, this would provide additional support
for the thesis that the Act of 1776 abolishing fee tail had little practical significance. 1 However, after 1710, fee tail restrictions had had considerably more
bite in Virginia than in England. 72 After 1710, the Assembly required substitution of property by the tenant in tail, according to the original restrictions, as
a condition of obtaining a private act disentailing property." Many tenants in
tail who petitioned for private fee tail acts were unsuccessful. 4
Virginia's Act of 1776, therefore, in explicitly extinguishing the interests
of "the issue in taille, and those in reversion and remainder" and giving the
68. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text
69. See BooRsTIN, supra note 20, at 120 (describing routine powers entrusted in House
of Burgesses, rather than to courts as in England); WOOD, supra note 20, at 182 (explaining that
"docking" of entails was "very common in Virginia"); cf Katz, Republicanism and the Law of
Inheritance, supra note 1, at 13 (noting abolition of fee tail in Virginia and other states "largely
formal and symbolic").
70. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (explaining use ofEnglish common law
proceedings to defeat entails).
71. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 40 (stating Jefferson favored abolishing entail
because of its symbolic associations); Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance, supra
note 1, at 13 (abolition of entail in Virginia and other states was "largely formal and symbolic").
72. See Act of Oct. 1710, ch. XIII, 3 LAWs OF VA., supra note 35, at 518 (prohibiting
courts from defeating fee tail in anyway). The goal oftheAct of 1710 was "preserving entails,"
instead of allowing tenants in tail to "defeat" the interests of the issue and remaindermen as in
contemporary English law. Carter v. Tyler, 5 Va. (1 Call) 165, 182 (1797). The subsequent
private fee tail acts effected "rather... a change of the lands on which the estate tail was to
operate; than... defeating that estate." Id. Compared to English law, Virginia's private acts
gave "a real recompense" by replacing the entailed property, "instead of the fictitious one, in the
form ofthe fine and recovery." Id.; see also supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (comparing law of colonial Virginia law with English law).
73. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing substitution procedures).
74. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (giving examples).
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tenant in tail a fee simple title," did not merely simplify an existing formality.
The Act of 1776 truly repudiated the substance of the Act of 1710.76 By
destroying previously valued and protected rights in property, the Act of 1776
produced utterly different outcomes and redistributed wealth.
B. Merely a Symbolic Change?
It has been asserted that the Virginia Assembly's abolition of the fee tail
in 1776 was largely symbolic rather than practical in significance because fee
tail tenure had not been employed widely in colonial Virginia. 77 If indeed the
Act of 1776 abolishing entail were merely symbolic, its enactment would not
imply that abolishing such property rights was perceived by the State Assembly as legitimate. But a statute abolishing a form of land tenure should not be
regarded as practically meaningful only if that form of tenure was predominant or widespread at the time. That is too elevated a standard. Instead, we
should ask whether the property interests being extinguished had been encountered sufficiently often by the legislators that they viewed the alteration
as having a nontrivial economic impact for them or for an appreciable number
oftheir constituents. If so, that should suffice as a criterion ofpractical significance. To say that abolishing fee tail held practical significance for contemporaries is not to deny that it held symbolic significance for them also.
The Assembly's abolition of the fee tail estate in 1776 should therefore
be judged to lack practical significance only if fee tail had been encountered
so rarely by those legislators that they would have perceived it as obsolete or
vestigial, not a living part of Virginia land law. One approach to making this
75. Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supra note 1, at 226 ("AnAct declaring
tenants of lands or slaves in taille to hold the same in fee simple").
76. See Act of Oct 1710, ch. xI, 3 LAWS OF VA., supra note 35, at 517-18; see also
supranotes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing legislative procedure for "docking" entails
developed afterAct of 1710).
77. See ALEXANDER, supranote 1, at 38 (concluding that in America, entail was significant for "symbolic role" rather than "functional effect"); Katz, Republicanism and the Law of
Inheritance,supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that abolition of entail in Virginia and other states was
"largely formal and symbolic"). The incidence and significance of fee tail tenure in colonial
Virginia have been much debated among social and political historians. See ROBERT E. BROWN
& B. KATHERINE BROWN, VIRGZIA 1705-1786 at 87 (1964) (noting most land in colonial
Virginia was held in fee simple, not fee tail); CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN
AMERICAFROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 208 (1987) (observing that use of entail was

"common" among "large tobacco planters"); Bailyn, supra note 20, at 154 ("Only a small
minority of estates, even in the tidewater region, were ever entailed."); Holly Brewer, Entailing
Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: 'AncientFeudalRestraints' andRevolutionaryReform, 54
WM. & MARY Q. 307, 311 (1997) (suggesting that at least half of the "seated" land in colonial
Virginia was entailed by 1776); C. Ray Keim, PrimogenitureandEntailin ColonialVirginia,
25 WM. & MARY Q. 545, 561 (1968) ("[O]nly in the Tidewater could [entail] be said to have
had a somewhat general use even among the great planter class.").
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historical determination would focus on the legislators' constituents and
would begin with the wills and deeds (many of which no longer survive) that
created fee tail estates. But I propose to focus instead on the members of the
1776 Assembly and their prior experiences with the private fee tail act procedure. Members of the 1776 Assembly who had themselves encountered Virginia's restrictive law of fee tail would not have perceived fee tail tenure as
rare or vestigial and would have appreciated the practical, economic impact
of the bill to abolish it. They would have understood that the Act of 1776
destroyed valuable property interests that had long been protected by the
colonial Assembly and that belonged to hundreds of heirs in tail, reversioners,
and remaindermen.75
Some members of the 1776 Assembly intimately knew the details of
colonial Virginia's legislatively administered law of substitution-based fee tail
because they held property as tenants in tail and had previouslyused the private
fee tail actprocedure and appreciated its constraints themselves. Ten members
of the 1776 Assembly holding property as tenants in tail had obtained private
acts from the colonial Assembly authorizing them to substitute land or slaves
owned in fee simple for their entailed property, 9 or to settle litigation regarding entailed property by such substitution."o
Five members of the 1776 Assembly had petitioned unsuccessfully for
private fee tail acts permitting such substitution in the Assembly sessions of
1774-1775 alone."1 Among these was Thomas Jefferson, proponent offee tail
78. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (describing legislative process required
to defeat entails between 1710 and 1776).
79. See GENERAL ASsMBLY REGISTER, supra note 65, at 122-24 (listing members of
General Assembly for 1776 session); Act ofNov. 1753, ch. XXVI, 6 Tim STATuTES AT LARGE:
BEING A COLLEcTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 405-07 (William Waller Hening ed.,
Richmond, Va., W.W. Gray 1819) [hereinafter 6 LAWS OF VA.] (private act for John Armistead);
Act of April 1757, ch. XXX, 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COiLECTION OF ALL TiE
LAWS OF VIRGIRIA 159 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va. Franklin Press 1820)
[hereinafter 7 LAWS OF VA.] (private act for Thomas Johnson); Act of March 1761, ch. XXVII,
7 LAWS OF VA., supra, at 440-44 (private act for Archibald Cary); Act of Nov. 1761, ch. X, 7
LAWS OF VA., supra, at 480-83 (private act for Mann Page, Jr.); Act of Oct. 1764, chXII, 8
LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 54 (private act for John Syme, in right of his wife); Act of Oct.
1765, oh. XLI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 161-63 (private act for Thomas Mann
Randolph); Act ofNov. 1766, ch. XXIII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 222-23 (private act
for Nathaniel Littleton Savage); Act of Nov. 1769, ch. LXXI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37,
at 442 (private act for David Garland); Act of Nov. 1769, ch. LXXXI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra
note 37, at 468-70 (private act for Nathaniel Littleton Savage); Act of Nov. 1769, ch. LXXXII,
8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 474 (private act for George Brooke).
80. See Act of Nov. 1766, ch. XXI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 218-22 (private
act for Charles Carter).
81. See GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGISTEl, supra note 65, at 122-24 (listing members of
General Assembly for 1776 session); JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSEs, 1773-1776, at
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abolition in 1776, who had sought a private act permitting his wife and him

to sell 2,400 acres of entailed land held in her right, upon settling fee simple
land "ofequal value" in place of the entailed land. 2 Therefore, for Jefferson

as for the others, his Act of 1776 to abolish fee tail certainly had a practical
aspect.' It empowered Jefferson and his wife to sell 2,400 acres of land without substituting other property for it, without regard to the property rights

previously held by the heir in tail and the reversioner. Another member of the
1776 Assembly had purchased land in fee simple from tenants in tail in con-

nection with two
private fee tail acts, which had required replacement of the
84
entailed land.
Some members ofthe 1776 Assembly knew Virginia's substitution-based
law of fee tail first-hand because they themselves had administered the substi-

tution requirement as trustees appointed by the Assembly. Sixteen members
of the 1776 Assembly had been named as trustees in one or more private fee

tail acts of the colonial Assembly.85 This duty required them to sell entailed

112, 116 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1905) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BunGESSES, 1773-1776] (noting passage of private act for Thomas Jefferson); id.at 127,266 (noting
petition for private act by William Digges); id. at 218 (noting passage of private act for
Nathaniel Littleton Savage); id. at 218, 229 (noting private act for Wilson Miles Cary); id. at
248, 269 (same for James Scott, Jr.).
82. See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, 1773-1776, supra note 81, at 83
(reporting petition for private act by Thomas Jefferson).
83. This is not to assert that Jefferson or other legislators who voted to abolish fee tail in
1776 were motivated by considerations of private rather than public benefit.
84. See Act of Oct. 1765, ch. XM, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 161, 163 (vesting
entailed property of Thomas Mann Randolph in Carter Braxton); Act of Feb. 1772, ch. LXVII,
8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 641-42 (vesting entailed property of James Blackwell in
Carter Braxton).
85. See GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGISTER, supra note 65, at 122-24 (listing members of
General Assembly for 1776 session); Act of Mar. 1761, ch. XXX, 7 LAwS OF VA.,supra note 79,
at 455-56 (appointing Archibald Cary as trustee); Act of Mar. 1761, oh. XXXI, 7 LAWS OF VA.,
supranote 79, at 458-60 (appointing Thomas Ludwell Lee as trustee); Act of Nov. 1761, oh. XI,
7 LAWS OF VA., supranote 79, at 483,485 (appointing Carter Braxton and Edmund Pendleton
as trustees); Act of Nov. 1761, oh. XII, 7 LAWS OF VA., supra note 79, at 488-89 (appointing
Carter Braxton as trustee); Act of Jan. 1764, oh. XII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 34,35
(appointing Archibald Cary as trustee); Act of Oct 1764, oh. XV, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37,
at 61, 62 (appointing Joseph Cabel and Archibald Cary as trustees); Act of Oct. 1764, oh. XVII,
8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 66-67 (appointing Richard Bland as trustee); Act ofNov. 1766,
oh. XX, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 218,221 (appointing William Fitzhugh as trustee);
Act ofNov. 1766, oh. LVI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 283-84 (appointing Carter Braxton
as trustee); Act of Mar. 1768, oh. VI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 301-02 (appointing
Wilson Mliles Cary as trustee); Act of Nov. 1769, oh. LXXI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at
442,444 (appointing Lodowick Farmer as trustee); Act of Nov. 1769, oh. LXXVII, 8 LAWS OF
VA., supra note 37, at 455-56 (appointing William Lyne as trustee); Act of Nov. 1769, oh.
LXXVIIL 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 457,459 (appointing Thomas Mann Randolph and
John Woodson as trustees); Act of Feb. 1772, ch. LXII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 631,
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property and to reinvest the proceeds in other property to be substituted in its
place, taking care to settle the new property according to the restrictive terms

of the will or deed that had created the entail originally. 6 There would have
been no reason for the Assembly to appoint trustees to fulfill these duties if
not to implement the rule that the entail-related future interests of inheritance,

remainder, and reversion must be protected.
Another source of direct personal experience with Virginia's law of fee

tail, shared by many members of the 1776 Assembly, was prior legislative
service. Almost half of the members of the 1776 Assembly (59 of 127) had
served in the colonial House of Burgesses. 7 Jefferson, whose committee had
introduced the fee tail bill in 1776, had served inthe House of Burgesses from
1769 on;88 during his time there, twenty-nine private fee tail acts were
enacted.8 9 During the cumulative experience ofthe Assembly of 1776, which
stretched back to 1748,90 the Assembly had enacted ninety private fee tail
acts.91 Even members ofthe 1776 Assembly who had served only in the House
of Burgesses session of 1774-1775, the last session to conduct business,'
633 (appointing George Brooke and William Lyne as trustees); Act of Feb. 1772, ch. LXVI, 8
LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 640-41 (appointing John Augustine Washington as trustee); Act
of Feb. 1772, ch. LXVII, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 643, 645 (appointing Lodowick
Farmer as trustee); Act of Mar. 1773, ch. XI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 663-64 (appointing Francis Peyton as trustee); Act of Mar. 1773, ch. XIV, 8 LAWS OF VA., supranote 37, at 667,
669 (appointing Mann Page as trustee).
86. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 1772, ch. LXVI, 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37, at 640-41 (explaining duties of trustees under private fee tail act).
87. CompareGENERALASSEMBLY REGISTER, supranote 65, at 122-24 (listing members
of General Assembly 1776 session), with id. at 81-104 (listing members of the House of Burgesses from 1748 to 1774). I exclude from consideration members of the House of Delegates
and the Senate of 1776 who were not admitted until after the vote on fee tail. I also exclude
from consideration the abortive House of Burgesses session of 1775-1776, which barely met
and transacted no business. See id. at 105 n.1 (summarizing history of last session of House of
Burgesses).
88. See GENERALAsSEMLYREGiSTErsupranote65,at97,99,102,105(listingThomas
Jefferson as member of House of Burgesses in 1769, 1769-1771, 1772-1774, and 1775-1776

sessions).
89. See general 8 LAWS OFVA., supra note 37,pasim (including all private fee tail acts
passed during Jefferson's service in House of Burgesses).
90. Richard Bland, Archibald Cary, and William Harwood, members of the 1776 General
Assembly, had served in the House of Burgesses session of 1748-1749. GENEaALASSMaLY
REGISTER, supra note 65, at 81-82; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIRGRIIA BIOGRAPHY 4-5, 8 (Lyon
Gardiner Tyler ed., 1915) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA oF VA. Bo.] (detailing legislative experience of Bland and Cary).
91. See generally6 LAWS OF VA., supranote 79,passim;7 LAWS OF VA., supranote 79,
passim; 8 LAWS OF VA., supra note 37,pasmim.
92. See GENERALASsEMBLYREGIsTER, supranote 65, at 105 n.1 (House of Burgesses
had no quorum and conducted no business at meetings in 1776).
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would have learned from that experience that petitions seeking a private act to
dock and replace fee tail property were regular items of legislative business in
Virginia. In that session alone, twenty petitions to obtain private fee tail acts
were presented. 93
Considered together, half of the members of the 1776 Assembly (65 of
127) previously had encountered, in some private or public capacity, colonial
Virginia's legislatively administered law of substitutable fee tail estates.94
They therefore knew that Virginia's private fee tail acts had preserved the
fiture interests of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen, while authorizing replacement of the underlying property,95 and were not finctionally
equivalent to judicial procedures for breaking entails under the English
common law.96 All these legislators would have known that the Act of 1776
sharply reversed the substance of prior law because it explicitly "extinguished" these interests.'
Even regarding members of the 1776 Assembly for whom there are no
documented sources of direct experience with fee tail tenure, widespread

familiarity with fee tail can reasonably be inferred. Some members of the
1776 Assembly would have known about Virginia's law of fee tail property
because they were lawyers. After 1734, tenants in tail could bar the entail on
a parcel worth £200 sterling or less by using "fine, or recovery, according to
93. SeeJoURNALS OFTHEHOUSEOF BURGESSES, 1773-1776,supranote81,at 83,86-87,
94,98,106,109,117,118-19,124,131,179,181,195,202,208,211,216 (reporting presenta-

tion of various petitions). I am not counting petitions presented in 1775 that duplicated petitions from the previous year.
94. This number is the sum of the ten members of the 1776 Assembly who previously had
obtained private feel tail acts for their own property, plus four other members who previously
had petitioned unsuccessfully for one or more private fee tail acts (Wilson Miles Cary, William
Digges, Thomas Jefferson, James Scott, Jr.), plus eleven other members who had been appointed as trustees under a private fee tail act (Richard Bland, Joseph Cabell, Lodowick Farmer,
William Fitzhugh, Thomas Ludwell Lee, William Lyne, Mann Page, Edmund Pendleton,

Francis Peyton, John Augustine Washington, and John Woodson), plus forty other members of
the 1776 Assembly who previously had encountered private feel tail acts as members of the
House ofBurgesses. See supranotes 79,81, 85,87-93 and accompanying text. Many members
of the 1776 Assembly fell into more than one of these categories.
95. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for substituting
fee simple property in place of entailed property); supra notes 42-56 (discussing effectiveness
of legislative substitution process in protecting derivative rights of other parties).
96. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing common law procedures
of fine and common recovery used to evade fee tail restrictions). After 1734, this legislative
system applied only to parcels of land worth over £200. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text

97. See Act of Oct.1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supra note 1, at 226-27 ("An Act
declaring tenants of lands or slaves in taille to hold the same in fee simple"); supra notes 69-76
and accompanying text (discussing practical effects ofAct of 1776).
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the laws of England,"' and thereby avoid the Assembly's property-replacement requirement. Virginia landowners invoking this procedure certainly
would have consulted a lawyer, because "fine" and "recovery" were notoriously arcane fictions of common-law litigation. 9 Eight volumes of ad quod
damnum writs were issued pursuant to the Act of 1734 and returned to the
General Court between 1734 and 1775, so we know that fine and recovery
were extensively used during this period."° It seems fair to infer that the

twenty or so members of the 1776 Assembly who had practiced law"e' would

have been generally conversant with Virginia's law of fee tail.
Some members ofthe 1776 Assembly would have known about Virginia's
distinctive law of fee tail through familiarity with Virginia's very active land
market. Many Virginia legislators, like the Virginia gentry generally, actively

bought and sold land for investment purposes."° Buyers in this market would
have encountered fee tail tenure as an incumbrance on title that had to be dealt
with in the Assembly or in the General Court, depending on whether the parcel

exceeded £200 sterling in value."° Thus, a letter from George Washington
refers to a friend who "having purchasd an Entaild Estate... Procurd a Act of
General Assembly for Docking the said Entail (other lands of equal value being
settled in lieu thereof)[,] but till such time as the Royal assent is obtaind he
cannot enter into quiet possession."" ° Parcels of entailed land were advertised
98. See Act of Oct. 1734, ch. VI, 4 LAWS OF VA., supra note 41, at 400 (allowing conveyance of land in fee simple to purchaser).
99. See, e.g., 2 WmIIAMBLACKSTONE, COmENTARIs ONTHELAWS OFENGLAND 11618 (1809) (describing common recovery and Statute of Fines).
100.
mUTES OF THBE CouNaCL AND GENERAL COURT OF CoLONEAL VIRG1INL 540 (H.R
Mcllwaine cd., 2d ed. 1979) (noting existence ofvolumesAto H of such writs). These records
do not survive. Id.
101. See 1ANTON-HERMANNCHRoUST,THERISEoFTHELEoALPROFESsIONINAMERICA
288-89 (1965) (listing Edmund Pendleton, George Mason, and Thomas Jefferson as prominent
Virginia lawyers); id at 292 n.281 (naming John Bannister, Richard Bland, Paul Carrington,
James Holt, Joseph Jones, Henry Lee, James Mercer, Robert Carter Nicholas, and Boiling
Starke as lawyers); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VA. Bo., supra note 90, at 9 (discussing Wflliam
Fleming); id. at 12 (discussing John Harvie); id at 12 (discussing James Henry); id. at 22
(discussing Thomas Ludwell Lee); id. at 31 (discussing Joseph Prentis); id. at 34 (discussing
Henry Tazewell); id. at 61 (citing appointment of Richard Cary and William Roscoe Wilson
Curle as appellate judges in 1779, which suggests that they were lawyers); CHARLES WARREN,
A HISTORY OF THE AMRCAN BAR 47 (1913) (indicating that Richard Henry Lee studied law
but never actively practiced).
102. See LUC= GRMIFT, THEVIRGINAHOUSE OFBURGESSES 1750-1774, at 129 (rev.
ed. 1970) (explaining large number of legislators were actively involved in land speculation).
103. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing Virginia legislative process
permitting replacement of entailed property, Act of 1734 exempted entailed parcels worth £200
or less).
104. Letter from George Washington to Robert Cary & Co. (Nov. 5, 1760), in 2 THE
WRITINGs OF GEORaE WASE]NGTON 354-55 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931) (original spelling).
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for sale in newspapers, either bytrustees already authorized by a private actto
sell1 °s or by tenants in tail, contingent upon obtaining a private act106
Family ties would have given some members ofthe 1776 Assembly additional familiarity with Virginia's law of fee tail. To give a prominent example, eight members ofthe 1776 Assembly were descended from Robert "King"
Carter,"° whose will had created massive estates in fee tail for each of three
sons." These members of the 1776 Assembly, whether or not they themselves were then tenants in tail or held associated rights of inheritance, reversion, or remainder, would have been quite familiar with the operation of fee
tail as a matter of family knowledge.
Thus, half of the members of the 1776 Assembly had direct experience
of Virginia's distinctive, substitution-based law of fee tail (as petitioners for
private acts, trustees, or Burgesses), and many others are likely to have been
familiar with fee tail based on practicing law, awareness of the land.market,
or family ties. For the Virginia legislators who voted on abolishing fee tail in
1776, then, the issue would have appeared as an eminently practical one,
whatever its symbolic aspect. Because the practical effect of abolishing fee
tail in 1776 was to extinguish the inheritance, reversion, and remainder interests and to transfer their value to the tenant in tail, 09 legislators would have
known that the Act of 1776 took real-world property rights of fellow Virginians that the Assembly had long protected. 1
1.

PresidentMadison andTerritorialStatutes Abolishing Fee Tail

Given that the Fifth Amendment was not meant to apply to the states,"'
modem scholars have concluded that the laws of the early republic offer no
105. See, e.g., VA. GAzETTE, May 9,1771, at 4 (listing property to be sold through trustees
byAct ofAssembly).
106. See, e.g., VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 1771, at 3 (offering to sell land pursuant to private
act to be procured).
107. See GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGISTER, supra note 65, at 122-24 (listing members of
GeneralAssemblyfor 1776 session);CI FoRDDoWDEY, THEVIRGLMIADYNASTIES: THEEMRGENCE OF "KING"CARTER AND THE GOLDENAGE 219, 309, 423-24 (1969) (discussing various
heirs of Carter, including son Charles Carter and grandsons Lewis Burwell, Benjamin Harrison,
Robert Carter Nicholas, Mann Page, and great grandson Mann Page, Jr.); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
VA. BIO., supranote 90, at 5-6 (grandson Carter Braxton); id.at 9 (grandson William Fitzhugh);
ied. at 11 (Benjamin Harrison); id.at 29 (Robert Carter Nicholas); id at 30 (Mann Page).
108. See DOWDE, supranote 107, at379-95 (reprinting selections from Carter'swill).
109. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing terms of Act of 1776); supra
notes 69-76 (discussing practical effects ofAct of 1776).
110. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on disentailing
property between 1710 and 1776).
111. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243,247,250-51 (1833) (holding that
Fifth Amendment applied only to federal government, not to states).
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examples by which to test the original understanding ofthe Takings Clause." 2
This conclusion is mistaken, in that it overlooks the early laws of the territories. The fee tail issue itselW as addressed in territorial laws, usefully exemplifies the original understanding ofthe Takings and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment.
The territories were appendages ofthe federal government, subject to its
supervision and control until they became states. The Constitution gave Congress "Power to... make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." ' Congress, in
turn, delegated legislative power to territorial lawmakers inthe various organic
acts, subject to review by the United States. Originally, territorial governments submitted laws to Congress for review." 4 After 1789, however, the
President, not Congress, assumed the function of reviewing territorial laws.'
The Northwest Ordinance, which Congress enacted under the Articles of
Confederation, contained its own statement of inhabitants' rights - anticipating the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment - to which
the territory's laws had to conform. 6 Later organic acts, too, promised to
protect territorial inhabitants' property, either incorporating by reference
rights recited in the federal Constitution'" or in an earlier organic act such as
the Northwest Ordinance,1 or explicitly reiterating terms protecting such
property."' Behind the organic acts stood the Constitution, operating by its
own force on territorial laws, and several treaties. 2 '
112. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Oriins ofRegulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight,1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211,1213 (1996).
113. U.S. CONST. arL IV, § 3, cl. 2.
114. See Ordinance of July 13, 1787, art I, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1845) (requiring government
of Northwest Territory to submit copies of all laws and proceedings to Congress).
115. Act of Aug. 7,1789, ch. VIII, I Stat 50, 52-53 (1848); see also, e.g., Act of June 4,
1812, ch. XCV, 2 Stat 743, 744 (1850) (requiring laws of Missouri Territory to be submitted
to President).
116. See art 1, I Stat at 52 (delineating rights of territory inhabitants).
117. See id. at 287 (requiring that laws adopted by District of Louisiana government be
consistent with Constitution); Act of June 4,1812, ch. XCV, 2 Stat 743,744 (1845) (requiring
laws passed by Missouri Territory be consistent with Constitution); Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch.
XXXVIII, 2 Stat 283, 284 (1850) (requiring that laws adopted by Orleans Territory government be consistent with Constitution).
118. See Act of April 7, 1798, ch.XXVIII, 1 Stat. 549,550 (1848) (granting inhabitants
of Msissippi Territory privileges outlined in Northwest Ordinance); Act of May 26, 1790, ch.
XV, 1 Stat. 123,123 (1848) (granting inhabitants "south of the river Ohio" privileges outlined
in Northwest Ordinance).
119. See Act of June 4,1812, ch. XCV, 2 Stat 743,747 (1850) (outlining rights ofMissouri Territory inhabitants).
120. See Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877) (noting history of state and territorial
regulation coexisting with Constitutional due process rights); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
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In 1812, the Mississippi Territory enacted a law stating that "every estate
in lands, or slaves, which now is or shall hereafter be an estate in fee-tail, shall
from henceforth be created an estate in fee-simple, and the same shall be discharged of the conditions annexed thereto by the Common Law."'
Passage

of this legislation extinguished existing property rights of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen and effectively transferred their value to current

tenants in tail. President Madison raised no objection to this law.
In 1816, the Missouri Territory enacted a law declaring that "[t]he doctrine of entails shall never be allowed, and in all cases where any real estate
shall be entailed, the whole ofthe right and interest ot in and to the same, shall
vest in fee simple in the person having the first reversion or remainder in said
estate, after the life estate is determined in said estate."' 2 Because the operation ofthis law extended to entails created both before and after its enactment,
it effectively extinguished the future interests ofthe heir's heir, any remaindermen, and the reversioner, deriving from entails already existing. The law
transferredthe value ofthese property rights to the heir ofthe current (or first)
tenant in tail. President Madison raised no objection to this law.
Thus, while Madison was president, the issue of the constitutionality of
territorial statutes abolishing fee tail arose ontwo occasions. Bothtimes, Madison acquiesced. Because Madison was so familiar with the issue of abolishing
fee tail,"z so sensitive to legislation affecting property rights, and so familiar
with the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (based on his
central role in its drafting), 24 his acquiescence in territorial laws abolishing fee
How.) 393, 450 (1857) (holding that Constitution applies in territories as well as elsewhere in
the United States). American treaties with Great Britain and France guaranteed protection of
inhabitants' "property" in various territories. See Treaty with France, Apr. 30, 1803, U.S.-Fr.,
art. I, 8 Stat. 200, 202 (1846) (guaranteeing property rights of inhabitants of Louisiana
Territory); Treaty with Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, 8 Stat. 116, 117
(guaranteeing property rights of British settlers in United States); Definitive Treaty with Great
Britain, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit, art. VI, 8 Stat 80, 83 (requiring post-war protection of
property rights). See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
OriginalMeaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000) (articulating late
eighteenth century view of difference between regulation and taking of land).
121. Act of Dec. 22, 1812, AcTS PASSED AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SEVENTH
GENERALASsEmBLY OF THE MissSsipi TERRiToRY 84,87 (Natchez, P. Isler 1812) (emphasis
added).
122. Act of Jan. 19, 1816,AcrsPASSEDBYTHE GNLALASSEMBLYOF TE TER ORY
oF MissoURI 32,33 (St. Louis, Joseph Charless 1816).
123. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (describing Madison's experience with
abolishing fee tail in Virginia Assembly).
124. Madison prepared the initial version of the federal Bill of Rights in 1789. He drafted
the Takings Clause of the Ffth Amendment on his own, not in response to a request from one
of the state conventions that had ratified the Constitution. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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tail tenure concretely expressed his understanding that these laws did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Madison's position on applying the Fifth Amendment to territorial laws abolishing fee tail is consistent with his previously and
subsequently expressed endorsement of Virginia's abolition of fee tail."2
IV Madison,Fee Tail, andPropertyRights
The foregoing discussion establishes several historical facts regarding
James Madison and the law of fee tail in Virginia, which in turn support other
propositions by inference. By 1785, Madison explicitly supported the Virginia
statutes that abolished certain property rights deriving from the fee tail estate
tenure."2 6 Madison, like other members of the state Assembly, knew that Virginia's abolition of fee tail was not merely a symbolic gesture. The existing
rights of'the issue intaille, and those in reversion and remainder" that the Acts
of 1776 and 1785 explicitly extinguished"2 were rights whose value the colonial Assembly had protected."r Madison therefore must have believed that the
Virginia Assembly's comprehensive abolition ofthese existing property rights
did not violate the "inherent right" of "acquiring and possessing property"
asserted in Virginia's recent Declaration of Rights."2
In late 1785, when Madison introduced the legislation that perfected the
abolition of fee tail tenure in Virginia, he was already expressing opposition
125. See infra notes 130-34,143-56 and accompanying text
126. Act of Oct.1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAws OF VA., supra note 1, at 226; Act of Oct 1785,
oh. LXI, 12 LAWS OF VA., supra note 8, at 154,156-57. It is conceivable that in 1776 Madison
might have preferred Pendleton's relatively moderate approach (making fee tail convertible to
fee simple by devise or conveyance at the option of the tenant in tail) to Jefferson's plan of
immediately abolishing all fee tail tenure by legislative fiat, the course adopted by the Assembly. But Pendleton's plan shared with Jefferson's the principle that it was legitimate to extinguish the derivative rights of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remainderman. See supra notes 5863 and accompanying text. In 1785, however, Madison himself introduced the legislation that
expanded the scope of the Act of 1776 so as to achieve its original objectives, completely eradicating fee tail tenure in Virginia. See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Oct 17,1785Jan. 21, 1786), supra note 8, at 13 (introducing bill "For regulating conveyances"); Act of Oct.
1785, ch. LXIL 12 LAWS OF VA., supranote 8, at 154,156-57 (regarding regulation of conveyances).
127. Act of Oct. 1776, ch.XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supranote 1, at 226; Act of Oct 1785,
ch. LXIL 12 LAWS OF VA., supra note 8, at 154,156-57.
128. See supranotes 36-57 and accompanying text (describing colonialAssembly's protection of interests of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen prior between 1710 and 1776).
129. See Va. Declaration ofRights § 1 (1776),9LAwsoFVA.,supranote 1,at 109. Again,
there is uncertainty regarding Madison's vote on fee tail in 1776. See supra note 127 and
accompanying text. But even Pendleton's more moderate proposal, permitting tenants in tail to
extinguish the future interests that Jefferson's plan proposed to abolish immediately, was in
principle (and potentially in application) just as destructive of existing property rights. See supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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to state legislation for interfering with property rights.' ° Interference with
property rights by state law was one of the chief reasons Madison cited. for
amending or replacing the Articles of Confederation.' It is scarcely conceivable that Madison himself would introduce legislation extending the abolition
of fee tail, if he felt that it, too, unjustly interfered with property rights.
As president of the United States, Madison acquiesced in the enactment
of two similar territorial statutes abolishing fee tail, which applied to existing
as well as to future entails. 2 Madison's acquiescence indicates that he did
not believe this legislation unjustly deprived territorial inhabitants ofproperty,
in violation of the Fifth Amendment or any analogous provision in applicable
treaties or federal statutes.'33 Madison's later approving references to Virginia's abolition of fee tail in his private writings indicate that he continued
to see this issue of property rights in the same light.'
Madison's support for abolishing fee tail in Virginia and his acquiescence
in the abolition of fee tail in the territories do not fit the modem interpretation
of Madison as a libertarian liberal, categorically opposed to all government
actions that would diminish existing property rights. 35 Laws abolishing fee
tail completely extinguished existing property rights of inheritance, reversion,
and remainder. 131 In contrast, Madison vehemently opposed contemporary
debtor relief measures that merely reduced the value of creditors' rights. 37
Given Madison's well-known devotion to protecting property rights from
state legislatures, what could justify his support for extinguishing the rights
of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen, and transferring their value
to others? One can best answer this question not by referring to the seemingly
comprehensive principles of property rights suggested by some of Madison's
130. See Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 351 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (recommending that state constitutions prohibit legislature from "seizing private property for public use without paying its full
valu[e]"); Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 18, 1785), id. at 422
(reporting on status of paper money proposal in Virginia Assembly).
131. See 9 THEPAPERs OFJAMES MADISONsupranote 9, at354-57;TH-FEDERALISTNO.
10 (Madison), in 10 TBEPAPERS OFJAMES MADISON, supranote 11, at 263,265 (declaring that
protecting property interests is "first object of government" and "the principle task of modem
legislation').
132. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (citing treaties and statutes 'with property rights provisions analogous to those of Fifth Amendment).
134. See infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (describing prevailing view that Madison
opposed all government interference with individual property rights).
136. Act of Oct. 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supranote 1, at226.
137. See 9 THE PAPERS OF JAmES MADISON, supra note 9, at 349 (arguing that state laws
granting any form of debtor relief unfairly infringed on rights of creditors in other states).
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better-known texts,138 but by referring to Madison's more concrete remarks
regarding abolition of fee tail and related measures.
Madison viewed abolishing fee tail as part of enacting a broader social
and economic legislative agenda of instituting 'the republican laws of descent
and distribution."1 39 This agenda also included substituting partible inheritance
for primogeniture as the rule of intestate succession to real property' 40 and

abolishing the doctrine of survivorship injoint tenancy. 141 In this context, at
least, Madison's use of the term "republican" conforms to the modem historians' sense of the eighteenth century political principle holding that property
rights "could and should be subordinated to the welfare of the polity."' 42

The justification Madison gave for abolishing fee tail lay in the perceived
side-effects of fee tail on the 143
moral virtue of the citizenry. This "suffering"
visited on society by "entails"' explained why entails were "contraryto good
138. See THE FER)MUsTNO.10 (Madison),in 10 TH PAPERS OF JAME MADISON, sUpra
note 11, at 263, 265-66; Property,NAT'L GAZETTE, March 27, 1792, in 14 T11 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
139. See4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage, supranote 8, at 30 (describing goal of "republican
laws of descent and distribution" as gradually "equalizing the property of the citizens"). In the
narrowest sense, "descent and distribution" refer to intestate succession only. But these terms
also can refer to succession generally. Madison uses the term "descent" to include "entail." See
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 31, 1824), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHM
W~rIIGS OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 8, at 477 (referring to "entails or other fetters attached
to the descent of property by legal acts of its owners"). This association of entail with descent
was common because in practice entail typically incorporated the rules of primogeniture, by
itselfa rule of intestate succession.
140. SeeAct ofOct. 1785, ch. LX, 12 LAWs OFVA.,supra note 8, at 138 (adopting partible
inheritance for intestate succession to real property); Thomas Jefferson, A Bill Directing the
Course ofDescents, in 2 TBE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEmESON 391,391-93 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1950) (same). Changing the rule of intestate distribution did not infringe on property rights;
before death a decedent might have made a will that disinherited any person who might otherwise have taken by intestacy. See id. at 361 (specifically limiting bill's application to property
owners who die intestate).
141. Actof Oct. 1786, ch. LX, 12 LAWS OFVA.,supra note 8, at349-50. As inthe case
of abolishing fee tail, private property rights were extinguished: the abolition applied to existing
as well as prospective joint tenancies, "whether they be such as might have been compelled to
make partition, or not." Act of Oct 1786, ch. LX, 12 LAWS OFVA., supranote 8, at 350. Madison introduced this legislation in the October 1785 session of the Assembly. See JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Oct. 17, 1785-Jan. 21, 1786), supra note 8, at 14 (introducing bill
"[c]onceming partitions and joint rights and obligations"). The shared function of abolishing
fee tail, abolishing primogeniture, and abolishing the doctrine of survivorship in joint tenancy
was to favor "subdivision of property" among family members and thereby over time "equaliz[e]
the property of the citizens." See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19,
1786), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 9, at 76; 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage,supranote 8, at 30 (asserting that fee tail imposes "suffering" on society).
142. ALEXANDER, supra note 1,at29.
143. 3 LETERS AND OTHER WRrmsGS OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 8, at 477.
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policy1 44 and why existing entails could not simply be left in place. Virginia's Declaration of Rights expressed this sense of urgency; "temperance,
frugality, and virtue" were essential if "liberty" itself were to survive.14 Of
course, a certain degree ofgovernmental concern for morality can coexist with
libertarian principles of property law." But what was characteristically
republican about Madison's perspective was his extremely heightened sensitivity about moral virtue and his perception that the extravagance of private
individuals greatly harmed the public.
Thus, Madison believed that one of the principal "causes, tainting the
habits and manners of the people under the Colonial Government" had been
the "too unequal distribution of property, favored by laws derived from the
British code, which generated examples in the opulent class inauspicious to
the habits of the other classes." 47 Madison was implicitly referring to the
common law devices of fee tail, primogeniture and survivorship in joint tenancy. In contrast, Virginia's reformed law of succession (including the abolition of fee tail) meant that although "great wealth" might still come to "individuals" "for a certain time," "the opportunities may be diminished and the
permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of the laws."'"
Consequently, Madison hoped, "the wealthy... must cease to be idlers
and become laborers," with a reduced "capacity to purchase the costly and
ornamental articles consumed by the wealthy alone."' 4 9 Madison predicted
that "[firom a more equal partition ofproperty, must result a greater simplicity
of manners, consequently a less consumption of manufactured superfluities,
144. See Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXV, 9 LAWs OF VA., supra note 1, at 226 (declaring
"gifts" of property in fee tail to be "contraty to good policy").
145. See Va. Declaration ofRights (1776),9 LAWS oF VA., supra note 1, at l1l; see also
JAMES MADISON, Fashion, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 20,1792, reprinted in 14 Ti PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 257, 258 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (arguing that "those [occupations] are the least desirable in a free state which produce the most servile dependence of one
class upon another," that such dependence "must increase as the mutuality of wants is diminished").
146. See Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623,669 (1887) (upholding state law closing breweries
against Fourteenth Amendment challenge). The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found, did
not restrain states from protecting the "safety, morals or health of the community." Id.
147. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (March 2, 1819), in 3 LETrs AND
OTHE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 8, at 122.
148. See 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage, supra note 8, at 24 (emphasis added). Dictating
"permanency" of land ownership within bloodline was the function offee tail tenure. Abolishing
fee tail would tend to promote partible inheritance of land. Abolishing fee tail also would enable
the current generation - especially those who proved to be "idlers" rather than "laborers" - to sell
or mortgage inherited land.
149. Id.; 14 MADISON, Fashion, supra note 145, at 258 ("The condition of those who
receive employment and bread from the precarious source of fashion and superfluity, is a lesson
to nations.").
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and a less proportion of idle proprietors and domestics."' 50 The issue of fee
tail shows that inculcating virtue in the citizenry could even justify taking
away property rights. Although 'the first object of government" might be to
protect "different and unequal faculties of acquiring property" generally, 151
inheriting entailed property was such a socially undesirable way of acquiring
property that it was appropriate for the legislature to abolish this form of land
tenure.
The "more equal partition" of family property that Madison favored 52
suggested comparison with natural law as well as the social vision of an agrarian yeomanry of owner-cultivators. Madison anticipated approvingly that as
the land gradually became "subdivided," more land would be "actually cultivated by the owner.""I53 This trend would bring ownership rights into closer
congruence with what Madison called "the principle of natural law, which
vests in individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with which
they have incorporated their labor and improvements.' 54
Thus Madison's own remarks on the subject of abolishing fee tail do not
reflect a categorical predisposition to secure or sanctify property rights generally, as would follow from a hands-off, libertarian principle of property.
Madison's remarks instead reflect the premise, at the time still traditional, that
property ownership consisted of "a right of stewardship that the public entrusted to an individual, for both private and public benefit," not "an absolute
right that exempted the individual from corporate oversight." ' Entailing land
was not tortious, 56 of course, but Madison found it to be sufficiently contrary
to the public good that it merited nullification.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS
9, at 77. The social change Madison envisioned would take
time. The immediate consequence of extinguishing rights of inheritance, reversion and
remainder was to transfer their value to the tenant in tail, thus temporarily increasing the
concentration of ownership to that which Madison objected.
151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Madison), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 11, at 265.
152. SeeLetterfromJamesMadison to ThomasJefferson(June 19,1786), in 9 THEPAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 9, at 77.
150.

OF JAMES MADISON, supra note

153.
154.

See 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage, supranote 8, at 24.
See id.; cf THOMAS JEFFERSON,Autobiography, supra note 5, at 69 (asserting that

abolishing fee tail did not violate "a single natural right of any one individual citizen").
155. See AIExANDEtR, supra note 1, at 29 ("The core of American republican thought
during the eighteenth century was the idea that private 'interests' could and should be subordinated to the common welfare of the polity."); SHAIN, supra note 14, at 183 (describing eighteenth century view of property ownership).
156. Cf.Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (declaring that
"confiscatory regulations" cannot be newly legislated or decreed without compensation, but
must "inhere in... the State's law of property and nuisance"); Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623,
667 (1887) (stating "[the] fundamental principle that every one shall use his own [property] as
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Madison's continuing endorsement ofabolishing fee tail shows that he did
not believe that justice required constitutionalizing the status quo of private
rights. Plainly, he did not believe that common law property rights enforceable
yesterday as between private citizens were always constitutionally protected
against legislation today. To the contrary, Madison argued:
If it be understood that the common law is established by the constitution,
it follows that no part ofthe law can be altered by the legislature... and
the whole code with all its incongruities, barbarisms and bloody maxims
would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United States."57
Fee tail tenure was an example of "established" law as to which society now
withheld its "tacit consent. 158
Madison's belief that a state might validly redistribute property was not
confined to abolishing fee tail and survivorship among joint tenants, both of
which primarily affected transmission of property within the family. Longevity of property rights might threaten the public good outside the family context
also. During the controversy over whether to relocate the College of William
and Mary from Williamsburg to Richmond, Madison declared:
Mihe time surely cannot be distant when it must be seen by all that what
is granted by the public authority for the public good, not for that of
individuals, maybewithdrawn and otherwise appliedwhenthepublic good
so requires; with an equitable saving or indemnity
159only in behalf of the
individuals actually enjoying vested emoluments.

Madison highly valued stability of property rights,1 "° and he was in that sense
"conservative," but only up to a point. The case of fee tail marks such a point.
Indeed, for Madison the abolition of fee tail was an example that would
support by analogy the validity of legislation imposing public control on
ecclesiastical property, even where such property had not originated in a
public grant.
not to wrong and injure another" embodied the regulatory power that "belonged to the States
when the Federal Constitution was adopted" (quoting Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,

667 (1878)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. JAMEsMADISoN,TheReportofl800,reprintedin17THEPAPERSOFJAMESMADISoN
307,331-32 (David B. Mattem et al. eds., 1991).
158. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4,1790), in 13 THEPAPERS OF
JAMEs MADISON 18, 20 (Charles F. Hobson &Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981).
159. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 31,1824), in 3 LErn AND
OTBERWRnNs OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 8, at 477; cf.Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 650 (1819) (holding that college's charter of incorporation
was constitutionally protected from state interference). This statement indicates that Madison
did not limit the scope of his principle to real property.
160. See 9 THE PAP
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 9, at 353-54 (condemning "muta-

bility of the laws of the states").
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Nor can it long be believed that, although the owner of property cannot
secure its descent but for a short period, even to those who inherit his
blood, he may entail it irrevocably and forever on those succeeding to his
creed, however absurd or contrary to that of a more enlightened age. 1 '
Madison referred approvingly to "the Great Reformation of Ecclesiastical
abuses in the 16th century,' 62 which in England had included legislative confiscation of the property of monasteries and abbeys."e Plainly, Madison did
not view the abolition of fee tail as a uniquely appropriate occasion for legislatively altering property rights.
Conclusion
James Madison actively supported Virginia's abolition of fee tail in
1785, " and he never receded from that position. 65 Yet abolishing fee tail
meant "extinguishing" property rights of '"he issue in taille, and those in
reversion and remainder"'" that the Virginia Assembly had long protected. 67
Madison's endorsement of abolishing fee tail therefore provides an important
counterexample to the view that Madison and the framers of the Constitution
categorically favored protecting all rights of private property from legislative
interference.
The reasons Madison gave for supporting abolition of fee tail, moreover,
center on a perception of public harm that is quite at odds with libertarian
concepts of property rights. Madison's support for abolishing fee tail was
ultimately a matter of seeking to promote a better, more virtuous republic.
Substantial inherited wealth itselfthreatened trouble. Citizens of "the opulent
class" were "idlers""e whose example had tainted "the habits and manners of
the people. 1 69 Abolishing fee tail tenure offered the prospect of diminishing
161. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 31,1824), supra note 159, at
477. This statement indicates that Madison did not limit the scope of his principle to real
property.
162. IR
163. See 31 Hen. 8, c. 13 (1539), in 3 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 733 (photo. reprint
1993) (1817).
164. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (detailing Madison's introduction of bill
for complete abolition of fee tail tenure).
165. See supranotes 134-63 and accompanying textpazim.
166. Act of Oct 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supranote 1, at 226.
167. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text (describing Virginia Assembly's protection).
168. See 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage, supra note 8, at 30.
169. See Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (March 2,1819), in 3 LETTES AND
OTHER. W1~rrlGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 8, at 122 (arguing English property law
"generated examples in the opulent class inauspicious" to other classes).
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"'leopportunities" ofinheriting "great wealth" and its "permanency,17 0 as part
of instituting of"republican laws ofdescent and distribution.""' For Madison,
the social objective of promoting "a greater simplicity of manners, consequently a less consumption ofmanufactured superfluities, and a less proportion
ofidle proprietors and domestics 172 justified extinguishing the existing private
property rights of heirs in tail, reversioners, and remaindermen. 1 3 Madison's
position on fee tail thus fundamentally qualifies his famous articulation of the
libertarian principle of individual autonomy, that "the first object of govern1 74
ment" is to protect "different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.

170. See 4 MADISON, Notes on Suffrage, supra note 8, at 24 (predicting that abolition of
fee tail would provide more even distribution of wealth).
171. See id. at 30 (describing goal of"equalizing the property of the citizens").
172. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1786), in 9 ThE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 9, at 77.
173. SeeAct of Oct. 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 LAWS OF VA., supranote 1, at 226 (abolishing fee
tail estate).
174. THEFEDERAuSTNo. 10 (Madison), in10 THEPAPERS OFJAMESMADISONsupra note
11, at 265.

